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ABSTRACT 
 
CAN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROMOTE FINANCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
 
By 
 
YUMI PARK 
 
 
The role of foreign aid on economic development has been an inconclusive and 
tedious debate for decades. In the meantime, most of studies on financial development 
and economic growth conclude that financial development significantly and positively 
affects economic development. Only few studies, however, shed light on foreign aid 
as a determinant of financial development. 
Based on the findings of positive role financial development on economic growth, this 
paper explores the aspect of official development assistance as a determinant of 
financial development that can lead economic development in developing countries. 
The empirical result shows that official development assistance significant and 
negative on both financial depth and breadth than other foreign capital inflows, such 
as remittances and foreign direct investment in developing countries. The results 
come up with future policy implications on delivery aid and reporting system of 
official development assistance. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The effectiveness of foreign aid has been a long and tedious debate for decades. In 
particular, most of research puts more weight on investigating the role of foreign aid 
on economic development, such as economic growth and poverty reduction, in aid 
recipient countries. However, economic growth and poverty reduction are more likely 
the ultimate goals followed by a country’s economic activities. In other words, it takes 
certain period of time to achieve these goals with foreign aid and there will be other 
several factors rather than foreign aid. Therefore, it cannot be simply explained that 
examining the direct association between aid and economic development. 
In contrast to the literature on aid and economic development, financial development 
and economic growth relationship surveys have more converging conclusion. While it 
was common point of view that financial development only follows economic 
development in 1950s, since Schumpeter raised the important role of financial sector 
for the economic development, the causal relationship between financial development 
and economic growth has been a popular research issue in the economic development 
study. Since Goldsmith (1969) and McKinnon (1973) came up with positive evidence 
of financial development and economic growth, several researchers have proved the 
positive role of financial sector on economic growth. 
Therefore, based on the previous findings that financial development is positively 
associated with economic development, this paper tests the role of foreign aid on 
financial development that one of the important source of economic growth and finds 
policy implications by comparing the effects of other foreign capital inflows, 
remittance and FDI which are major foreign capital inflows in developing countries.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As Levine, R. (1997) defined five primary functions of the financial systems as 
diversifying and mitigating risk, allocating resources and information, monitoring  
managers and enhancing corporate control, mobilizing and pooling savings, and 
facilitating the exchange of goods and services from previous studies, Zhuang et al. 
(2009) precisely presents the role of the financial development as figure 1.  
Figure 1 Financial Development and GDP per Capita Growth 
 
Source: Zhuang et al. (2009)  
Additionally, Levine, R. (1997) analysed number of literature that proving financial 
sector development is not followed by other industries’ development but one of the 
important sources for economic growth. 
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Compare to the flourishing financial development and economic growth research, the 
determinants of financial sector study is less popular and focuses on non-economic 
factors. This paper explores previous studies on the determinants of financial 
development in order to find appropriate explanatory variables of the paper. 
 
1) Determinants of Financial development 
Among a number of financial development literature for decades, only few research 
comprehensively investigated the source of financial development. While most of 
researchers concentrated on one or two related determinants of financial development, 
Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2005) categorize six groups of financial 
development factors and conduct comprehensive empirical study based on previous 
literatures. The six determinants categories are ① geography, endowments and legal 
origin, ② political environment, ③ macroeconomic variables, ④ bank ownership 
and market structure, ⑤ investment climate indicators, and ⑥ supervisory and 
regulatory framework. The research empirically examines these determinants in low- 
and lower middle-income countries using OLS estimation with averaged data of 
1999-2001. This paper finds that the inflation, corruption, and settlers’ mortality are 
still significant determinants of financial sector development in low-income countries. 
However, the legal origin determinant that La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) argued is not 
statistically significant on the financial development in this study. 
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine (2008) classify the determinants of financial 
development as historical factors and policy factors based on previous literature. To 
be specific, the historical factors include legal, political and geographic differences 
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and the policy factors comprehensively cover from political endowment to regulatory 
policies. 
Besides Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2005) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 
(2008), most literature investigated specific factor as a determinant of financial sector 
development. 
The one of the most well-known determinants of financial sector development is the 
difference of legal traditions. La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) finds that the different legal 
origins facilitate different property right and contract enforcement mechanisms which 
are key foundation of financial development. In particular, the research proved that 
the countries with British common law origin which is more focused on investors’ 
right have more development financial system than with French civil law origins that 
put more weight on states’ right. 
Similar to the legal origin determinant, endowment becomes popular topic of financial 
sector development in early 2000s. Among the research, Acemoglu et al. (2001) 
argues the environmental situation of colonies affects the financial sector growth. This 
is because the possibility of gaining vital diseases in colonies decides the colonization 
strategies and settlement of colonizer. 
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2003a) point out that both legal origin and 
endowment theory are converged colonization. The paper tests the legal origin 
controlling the endowments and other county specific factors at the same time. They 
found that the property right that based on legal origin is significant despite of the 
variables control. 
A broader perspective has been adopted by Girma and Shortland (2008) who defined 
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the legal origin and endowment as “deep institutions” and represent “political 
approach” with stability of regime and democratic level as determinants of financial 
development. The literature proves that the democracy and political stability are 
associated with financial development using panel regression and GMM. They show 
that the growth of financial sector depends on the political stability and democracy 
rather than the “deep institutions” such as legal origin and endowment in the long run.  
Huang (2011) analyses the role of institutional improvement on financial development 
in 90 countries during 1960-1999 with panel data GMM method. The main finding of 
the study is that in the short run the improvement of institutions is positively 
associated with financial development. 
Law et al.(2012) examines that financial development is influenced by institution and 
governance in over 51 both developed and developing countries using world 
Governance Indicators and International Country Risk Guide dataset. The study 
concluded that institution and governance are positively and significantly associated 
with banking sector growth. In contrast with banking sector, the equity market growth 
is not significantly associated with institutional and governance indicators. 
Unlike the institutional determinants research, Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) 
brought the macroeconomic factors into financial development research. They proved 
that inflation have a significant and negative impact on banking sector and equity 
market development. 
Baltagi et al. (2009) investigated the relationship between trade openness and 
financial sector growth in 42 developing countries during 1980-2003. The paper 
proved that trade openness is a statistically significant on banking sector growth with 
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panel data analysis. 
 
2) Aid and financial development 
Jens Kovsted (2000) defined the five roles of financial sector aid. First, financial 
sector aid can maximize the official development assistance (hereafter ODA) because 
the total amount of ODA is getting smaller than private sector inflow. Second, 
financial sector aid plays a role to set the proper regulation during the financial 
liberalization. Third, financial sector aid protects the national economy from the 
external and internal financial crisis or failure. Fourth, the financial intermediaries 
subsidized by financial sector aid decrease the information asymmetries, transaction 
costs, and other financial costs. Fifth, according to “the two three gap model” 
insufficient saving hider the growth, the financial sector aid can fill the gap. 
 Regarding to relationship between the ODA, financial development and economic 
growth, there are only a few research papers. Nkusu and Sayek (2004) found that 
ODA can generate positive growth effects indirectly and such growth is larger with 
deeper financial market through weighted least squares regression. They concluded 
that development of local financial market enhances aid effectiveness. 
 
3) Remittance and financial development 
Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2005) prove that remittances and 
bank deposits and credits to the private sector are positively related with data from 
109 countries for the period 1975-2007. 
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Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) find that remittance promotes the financial sector in 
developing countries with the data for about 100 countries. In particular, the research 
proved that growth of bank deposits positively and significantly associated with 
remittances inflows. 
More recently, Demirgüç-Kunt, Córdova, Pería, and Woodruff (2011) concluded that 
the remittances positively affect financial breadth which represented by the number of 
bank branches and bank accounts per capita. In the meantime, they argued that the 
financial depth, the bank deposits significantly related to remittances using exploring 
Mexico case. 
 
4) FDI and financial development 
The literature on relationship between FDI and financial development mostly 
investigate financial sector development as a precondition for increasing FDI.   
Hermes, Niels, and Robert Lensink (2003) argued that a country with well-developed 
financial system more efficiently use the FDI than other countries. The research 
implies the economic growth can be achieved by developing financial system to let 
FDI contribute to economic growth.  
Similarly, Lee, Chien-Chiang, and Chun-Ping Chang (2009) tested the influence of 
financial development and FDI on economic growth with the data of 37 countries 
during 1970-2002. The study shows that the financial sector development is more 
statistically significant to the economic growth rather than the level of FDI. 
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III. ODA, Remittances and FDI 
The trend of foreign capital flows are shown in figure 2. After early 90s the amount of 
ODA has not be increased. In contrary, amount of FDI to developing countries starts 
to boost from 2003. However, due to the global financial crisis in 2008 the amount of 
FDI sharply decreased. Remittances gradually increase from 90s, and late 90s caught 
up ODA. This paper mainly analyses the period from 1998 to 2011 when the three 
different foreign capital inflows start to diverse. 
 
Figure 2 Total ODA, FDI, and Remittance (USD millions) 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database(World Bank), stat OECD(OECD DAC) 
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1) Official Development Assistance 
The ODA inflows to developing countries by income level are drawn in figure 3. 
Interestingly, the ODA flow to lower middle income countries has been higher than 
low income countries until early of 2000s. The ODA flows to upper middle income 
countries also had increased until early of 2000s then rapidly decreases. 
 
Figure 3 ODA by income levels (USD millions) 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database(World Bank), stat OECD(OECD DAC) 
 
2) Remittances 
The remittance inflow trend is shown in the figure 4. The total amount of remittances 
that flows into developing countries are rapidly increased from 2000s. However, the 
amount flows into low income countries less than one fourth of lower-middle income 
countries in 2011. 
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Figure 4 Remittances by income levels (USD millions) 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database(World Bank), stat OECD(OECD DAC) 
 
 
3) Foreign Direct Investment 
There is a dominant contrast in FDI as shown in figure 5. The FDI inflow to upper 
middle income countries is about 6-7 times larger than one in lower-middle income 
and low income countries. Especially, from early 2000s the FDI amount sharply 
increases. 
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Figure 5 ODA by income levels (USD millions) 
 
Source: Global Financial Development Database(World Bank), stat OECD(OECD DAC) 
 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
Previous research on determinants of financial development tends to hire the OLS 
estimation with cross-sectional data. However, questions on average cross country 
data has been raised as Rajan R. G. and Subramanian, A. (2008) pointed that the cross 
sectional OLS cannot avoid endogeneity problem because of the possibility of 
omitting variables. They also mentioned that using lagged endogenous variable in 
cross sectional analysis makes the regression model questionable. In contrast to the 
cross section analysis, the panel data analysis can correct the endogeneity problem 
more effectively. In this study, therefore, the panel data analysis is employed both the 
fixed effect model and GLS random effect model depends on the result of Hausman 
test.  
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financial development. To examine this question, the basic model stands as follows: 
ܨܦ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܦ௜,଴ ൅ ߚଶܨܥٛܫ ,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ܨܴܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (1) 
where FDi,t indicates the percentage change of financial development indicators for 
country i at period t. FCIi,t the variable of interest, indicates the percentage change of 
three different foreign capital inflows, specifically ODA, remittances, and FDI, for 
country i at period t. Controlsit indicates set of control variables, FRLAWi stands for 
country dummies, and Ɛi,t for the error term. In order to control for general 
determinants of financial development during this period, variables such as 
institutional indicators (ICRG, WGI), change rate of inflation rate and trade to GDP 
are included. In addition, as La Porta et al. (1998) yield that the individual property 
right is less protected in the French civil law countries than other law tradition 
countries. In the third regression, we hired the French law countries as a dummy 
variable. 
Additionally, the 2 years lagged foreign capital flows variables are hired in order to 
capture the time to transfer from foreign capital flows to financial development. 
Generally, both 2 years and 5 years lags are considered, however, in the paper only 2 
years lag is applied due to the short time span of target periods. 
ܨܦ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܦ௜,଴ ൅ ߚଶܨܥܫ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ܨܴܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (2) 
The second research question of the study is that the impact of foreign capital inflows 
in the financial breadth indicators, in particular percentage change of number of bank 
branches and number of ATMs per thousand adults. The related models stand for as 
follows:  
ܨܤ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܤ௜,଴ ൅ ߚଶܨܥܫ௜,௧ ൅ ߚଷܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ܨܴܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (3) 
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ܨܤ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܨܤ௜,଴ ൅ ߚଶܨܥܫ௜,௧ିଶ ൅ ߚଷܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ ൅ ܨܴܮܣ ௜ܹ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ (4) 
where FBi,t indicates the percentage change of financial breadth indicators for country 
i at period t. the other variables stands for same as model (1).    
In order to find the most efficient estimates, both fixed effect model and random 
effect model are tested in this paper. After all, depends on the control variables both 
fixed effect estimation and random effect estimation are chosen as an appropriate 
methods by Hausman test. Therefore, in case of the fixed effect estimation, the time 
indifferent variables, dummy and initial level of financial development, are not 
considered as explanatory variables in the final results.  
 
V. DATA 
The data are mainly acquired from OECD DAC statistics, World Bank, and the PRS 
group. Appendix contains the description and sources of variables and presents 
summary statistics. The data to assess the research questions are from 1998 to 2011 
for financial development and from 2004 to 2011 for financial breadth. This is 
because that most data of former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) is only 
available from 1998 and the World Bank survey on financial breadth in developing 
countries launched in 2004. Depends on the availability of variables, the number of 
observed countries for each test is differ. 
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1) Dependent variables 
The major dependent variables that used in this paper are commonly employed 
financial development indicators in previous financial development literature. In order 
to examine various type of financial development, the dependent variables are 
categorized by financial depth, efficiency and breadth. Especially, the test adopts the 
concept of financial breadth that indicates accessibility to the financial systems. The 
main difference with the previous research is that the stock market indicators are not 
considered as a financial development indicators. This is because the most of the 
developing countries do not have active stock markets. 
① Financial Depth 
As Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2008) pointed out, the size of financial sector may not 
fully present the depth of financial system. However, still most of financial literature 
relies on the various size measurements to capture the depth of financial sector. 
Instead, researchers hire additional variables such as efficiency, breadth. Thus this 
paper also hires the common financial depth indicators which used in previous study 
(e.g., King and Levine, 1993). 
(1) Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%) measures the amount of 
channelled savings to investors. In other words, a country with the more 
actively functioning financial intermediaries shows the higher ratio. It used 
Levine and Zervos (1998). 
(2) Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to 
GDP (%) is broader concept of Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 
(%). By including other financial institutions, such as insurance, pensions etc., 
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this measurement can capture more comprehensive financial intermediaries’ 
activities. This measurement used in Levine, Loayza and Beck (1999) and 
Beck, Levine, and Loayza (1999). 
(3) M2 Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP, and 
(4) Liquid liabilities to GDP (%) measure size of financial market. As King and 
Levine (1993a) claims the M2 and liquid liabilities simply shows the demand 
of financial service in the market. However, World Bank (2005) point out that 
some country where demand of currency is extraordinary high may have 
higher ratio of this measurement.  
(5) Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) measures the amount of 
credit that provided to the private sector such as loans, non-equity securities, 
and trade credits etc. In addition, it should be considered that for some 
countries the domestic credit to the private sectors include credit to public 
enterprises. 
② Efficiency  
(1) Credit to government and state owned enterprises to GDP (%) shows the 
ratio between credit by domestic money banks to the government and state-
owned enterprises and GDP. In contrast to the Deposit money bank assets to 
deposit money bank assets and central bank assets (%), this indicator implies 
the inefficiency of financial sector. In other words, the higher ratio means 
worse financial system because the credit allocated to government and state 
owned enterprises do not need evaluation process and monitoring as well. 
(2) Bank Deposit to GDP (%)  Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2005) uses 
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bank deposit to GDP to measure the ability of bank to attract financial savings 
and provide a liquid store of value. In developing countries, people may not 
use the financial system because of the trustworthiness and inconvenient. 
Therefore the measurement can capture the efficiency of banking system in 
developing countries. 
(3) Deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central 
bank assets (%) shows the monitoring and risk management efficiency of 
commercial bank. King and Levine (1993a) explained that commonly the 
deposit money bank, which means commercial bank works more efficiently in 
the monitoring projects and managing risks. Therefore, the higher ratio of this 
indicator means more commercial bank actively work. 
③ Financial breadth  
(1) Number of bank branches per 100,000 adults, and 
(2) Number of ATMs per 100,000 adults shows the accessibility of financial 
system that has been emphasized in developing countries as a financial 
inclusion issue. This paper employs the number of bank branches and ATMs 
per thousand adults as a proxy of financial system breadth. Due to the data 
availability the model tests the period from 2004 to 2011. 
 
2) Independent variables 
The main independent variable is total ODA net amount to GDP in recipient countries. 
Remittances to GDP and Foreign Direct Investment to GDP are hired as additional 
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independent variables in order to compare the impact of other foreign inflows. 
① Total ODA net to GDP (%) 
The ODA amount, explanatory variable for the empirical models, is measured as a 
percentage of ODA total net to GDP in each recipient country. In this study, the 
amount of ODA aggregated from all donors that include DAC member countries, non-
DAC countries, and multilateral donors.  
The net amount of ODA is the amount of gross disbursed ODA that deducted “the 
repayments of the principal on loans made in prior years (but not interest), offsetting 
entries for forgiven debt and any recoveries made on grants.” (OECD glossary) In 
some cases the negative amount of net ODA can be interpreted as actual foreign 
capital inflows by ODA is negative. Here, it should be pointed out that the gross 
disbursement ODA statistics provided by OECD DAC does not same as the inflow 
amount of ODA in the recipient countries. It implicates some part of the disbursed 
amount of ODA may be used in the donor countries or other countries. 
② Remittances to GDP (%) 
The percentage of remittances net to GDP in each recipient country hired as an 
explanatory variable in order to test the impact of other capital inflows on financial 
development.  
The remittances data is collected from the Global Financial Development Database of 
World Bank. The total amount of remittances consist of workers' remittances, 
migrants' transfers, and compensation of employees that defined in the fifth edition of 
the IMF's Balance of Payments Manual. To be more specific, workers’ remittances are 
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current private transfers from the workers who live more than a year in host country 
regardless of the immigration status. Migrants' transfers are the net worth of migrants 
is transferred at the time of migration. Compensation of employees is the income of 
non-residents who have stayed in the host country for less than a year. 
③ Foreign Direct Investment to GDP (%) 
Foreign direct investment is hired as the third explanatory variable that is considered 
as another important foreign capital inflow in developing countries. The amount of 
foreign direct investment consists of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other 
long-term capital, and short-term capital and data used from the Global Financial 
Development Database of World Bank. 
 
3) Other control variables 
In this paper, the determinants that proved in previous literature, such as legal 
traditions, Worldwide Governance Indicators, ICRG political risks rating, inflation, 
and trade, are employed as control variables. 
① Legal traditions 
La Porta et al. (1998) yielded that the individual property right that is enable the 
financial contracts is less protected in the French civil law countries than other law 
tradition countries. However, Detragiache, Gupta, and Tressel (2005) shows that the 
legal tradition does not have any significant impact on financial development in 
developing countries. In this paper to examine the contradiction of legal traditions 
hires the French law countries as a dummy variable and conducted the analysis. 
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② Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) 
Worldwide Governance Indicators has been used as the indicator of government 
quality. (Huang, 2011) The WGI consists of six different indicators which are ‘Voice 
and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.’ It has 
been measures since 1996 for 215 countries by World Bank Group. The range of 
indicator is -2.5 to 2.5. The indicator covers 32 existing data sources that are collected 
from four different groups from around the world.1 Compare to ICRG indicator, WGI 
includes more developing countries, even though the time series is relatively short. 
This paper employed each indicator to examine the different role of each institution. 
③ International Country Risk Guide(ICRG) - Political Risk Rating  
ICRG covers about 146 countries on an annual basis, and the assessment conducted 
by experts of each category. The International Country Risk Guide rating composed 
with three different risk ratings in politics, economics, and finance. Political Risk 
Rating, inter alia, comprehensively measures political risks in twelve different 
perspectives, such as ‘Government Stability (12 points), Socioeconomic Conditions 
(12 points), Investment Profile (12 points), Internal Conflict (12 points), External 
Conflict (12 points), Corruption (6 points), Military in Politics (6 points), Religious 
Tensions (6 points), Law and Order (6 points), Ethnic Tensions (6 points), Democratic 
Accountability (6 points), and Bureaucracy Quality (4 points).’2 The lower point 
                                          
1 WGI World Bank, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc, accessed May 25, 
2015 
2 The PRS Group, Inc., ICRG Methodology, P.3, THE POLITICAL RISK COMPONENTS – Table 3B 
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means the riskier situation of the country in indicated area. However, the ICRG 
indicator more concentrates on developed countries rather than developing countries.  
This paper uses log of corruption, democratic accountability, law and order, military 
in politics, internal conflict, and ethnic tensions ratings as control variables. 
④ Inflation  
As Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) found that the higher inflation brings a negative 
impact on financial sector development, the inflation rate is used as a control variable 
of financial development. 
⑤ Trade  
As shown in the literature review, Baltagi et al. (2009) pointed out the role of trade in 
financial development is significant. Therefore this paper employs trade to GDP as a 
general determinant of financial development.  
 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The empirical models are tested separately by time periods of 1984-2011, 1998-2011, 
and 2004-2011. Due to the availability of institutional quality data, both WGI and 
ICRG political risk rating are applied at each model respectively. Except for WGI 
variables all models use logged variables which make the distribution of data more 
closed to normal distribution to get more efficient estimates.  
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1) 1984 - 2011 
Firstly, as a primary test, the model (1) and (2) are tested with ICRG political risk 
rating indicators for the time period of 1984-2011. Table 1 shows the relationship 
between foreign financial flows and financial development in 1984-2011. In this 
estimation, The ODA and FDI empirical model used random effect and the 
remittances empirical model used fixed effect based on the result of Hausman test. 
Most of all, all the financial development variables are significant with negative 
percentage change of ODA and 2 years lagged ODA inflows. Even though only 51 
countries are observed in this estimation, this results shows that the ODA inflows will 
hinder financial development in developing countries in the long-term.  
 
Table 1 ODA, Remittances, and FDI on financial development (1984-2011)  
VARIABL
ES LN_ODA 
2 YRS 
LAGGED 
LN_ODA 
LN_REMI
TTANCES
2 YRS 
LAGGED 
LN_REMI
TTANCES
LN_FDI 
2 YRS 
LAGGED 
LN_FDI 
DEPTH (1) -0.0730*** -0.0959*** 0.00587 -0.0169 -0.00957 0.0148 
 (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0122) (0.0120) 
DEPTH (2) -0.0677*** -0.0927*** 0.0102 -0.0118 -0.00683 0.0219* 
 (0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0118) (0.0118) 
DEPTH (3) -0.0778*** -0.0923*** 0.0256*** 0.0172** 0.0105 0.0142** 
 (0.00932) (0.00893) (0.00806) (0.00761) (0.00710) (0.00664) 
DEPTH (4) -0.0226** -0.0371*** 0.0146 -0.00416 0.00911 0.0199** 
 (0.0111) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.00955) (0.00824) (0.00790) 
DEPTH (5) -0.0792*** -0.0887*** 0.0218* 0.0140 -0.00133 0.0177* 
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 (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0129) (0.0125) (0.0112) (0.0106) 
EFFICIEN
CY (1) -0.118*** -0.167*** 0.106*** 0.0951*** 0.0225 0.0408** 
 (0.0256) (0.0252) (0.0237) (0.0231) (0.0188) (0.0176) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) -0.0408*** -0.0606*** 0.00452 -0.00472 0.0185** 0.0325***
 (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.00858) (0.00854) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) -0.0554*** -0.0467*** 0.0482*** 0.0470*** 0.0102 0.0134** 
 (0.00921) (0.00926) (0.00751) (0.00707) (0.00641) (0.00602) 
AVG. 
OBSERVA
TION 
923 881 891 846 902 851 
AVG. 
NO OF 
COUNTR
Y 
51 51 52 52 52 52 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
2) 1998 - 2011 
The main research questions of this paper are comprehensively tested for the period of 
1998-2011. Here, all the models are fitted for fixed effect estimation than random 
effect model by Hausman test. Therefore, all the time invariant variables, legal origin, 
initial value of each financial development indicators are omitted. As mentioned 
before, two different institutional indicators, ICRG and WGI are respectively applied 
both model (1) and (2). Because most of the empirical results of model (2) are similar 
to the model (1), the results are shown in appendices to avoid redundancies. 
① Fixed effect estimation with ICRG indicators 
 
The impact of ODA on financial depth and efficiency are shown in table 2. As 
expected from primary estimation results, the increasing percentage change of ODA 
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to GDP decreases financial depth and efficiency indicators, except for efficiency (1) 
which is credit to government and state owned enterprises to GDP. The 
macroeconomic explanatory variables, in particular, percentage changes of trade 
positive on percentage changes of financial development indicators.  Despite of the 
previous study results on institutional variables, no variables are consistently valid on 
all the financial development indicators. 
Table 3 provides the coefficients of remittances on financial sector development 
indicators. The remittances are significant on financial development that means the 
increasing percentage change of remittances promotes the increase of percentage 
changes of financial development indicators, such as private credits, domestic credits 
and etc. These results are aligned with results of previous studies on remittance and 
financial development. Similar to the ODA and financial development, the trade 
indicator is still significant in this estimation. 
Lastly, the foreign direct investment and financial sector development is tested as 
shown in table 4. The estimators of logged FDI to GDP have positive and significant 
to most of financial depth and efficiency indicators.  At the same time logged value 
of trade to GDP is significant for most of tests.  
With the ICRG political risk rating indicators, only logged value of corruption is 
negatively related to financial development. Because the higher value of this indicator 
means less corrupted system, the one possible interpretation of this estimation is that 
in developing countries the improvement of corruption may shrink the financial 
sectors for a certain time period. However, the interpretation of this indicators should 
be more careful and further research should be conducted.  
24 
 
Table 2 ODA on Financial development 1998-2011 (ICRG) 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LN_ODA -0.129*** -0.126*** -0.0650*** -0.0538*** -0.137*** -0.00767 -0.0810*** -0.0553***
 (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0210) (0.0295) (0.0159) (0.0129) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.382*** 0.392*** 0.406*** 0.252*** 0.498*** 0.157 0.334*** 0.167*** 
 (0.0938) (0.0932) (0.0524) (0.0563) (0.0804) (0.112) (0.0641) (0.0478) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0370** -0.0346** -0.0175* -0.0115 -0.0389*** 0.0266 -0.0178 -0.000710 
 (0.0173) (0.0172) (0.00982) (0.0104) (0.0150) (0.0212) (0.0118) (0.00890) 
LN_CORR
UPTION -0.0841 -0.0652 -0.187*** -0.0899** -0.0794 -0.385*** -0.140*** -0.0293 
 (0.0639) (0.0635) (0.0356) (0.0384) (0.0546) (0.0763) (0.0437) (0.0321) 
LN_DEM
OCRATI 
CACCOU
NTABILI
TY 
-0.0662 -0.0598 -0.0463 -0.0131 -0.115 0.0372 -0.0579 0.0426 
 (0.0811) (0.0806) (0.0469) (0.0487) (0.0719) (0.101) (0.0555) (0.0427) 
LN_LAW
&ORDER -0.0145 -0.0128 -0.209*** -0.136** 0.00601 -0.324** -0.131* -0.0135 
 (0.107) (0.106) (0.0633) (0.0641) (0.0969) (0.136) (0.0731) (0.0582) 
LN_MILI
TARY IN 
POLITICS 
0.0663 0.0824 -0.244*** -0.00665 0.00867 0.106 0.0236 -0.0427 
 (0.103) (0.102) (0.0471) (0.0616) (0.0732) (0.101) (0.0702) (0.0432) 
LN_INTE
RNAL 
CONFLIC
T 
0.101 0.0935 0.180*** -0.0679 0.248** 0.153 0.0166 0.233*** 
 (0.118) (0.117) (0.0676) (0.0705) (0.104) (0.145) (0.0804) (0.0610) 
LN_ETHN
IC 
TENSION
S 
-0.174* -0.186* -0.106* -0.206*** -0.0911 -0.303** -0.177*** 0.0401 
 (0.0988) (0.0981) (0.0573) (0.0593) (0.0878) (0.123) (0.0675) (0.0529) 
CONSTA
NT 1.075** 1.074** 2.184*** 2.917*** 0.373 1.495** 2.090*** 2.901*** 
 (0.511) (0.508) (0.290) (0.307) (0.444) (0.621) (0.350) (0.266) 
OBSERVA
TIONS 653 653 726 653 725 725 653 690 
R-
SQUARE
D 
0.100 0.099 0.248 0.123 0.143 0.083 0.149 0.085 
NO. OF 
COUNTR
Y 
63 63 70 63 70 70 63 68 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3 Remittances on Financial development 1998-2011 (ICRG) 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LN_REMI
TTANCES 0.0937*** 0.0946*** 0.0664*** 0.0530*** 0.0815*** 0.0372 0.0819*** 0.0220** 
 (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0187) (0.0228) (0.0134) (0.00966) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.442*** 0.457*** 0.345*** 0.235*** 0.577*** 0.0813 0.306*** 0.153*** 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.0533) (0.0571) (0.0923) (0.112) (0.0670) (0.0478) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0408** -0.0400** -0.0155* -0.0111 -0.0443*** 0.0201 -0.0188 -0.00243 
 (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.00938) (0.00978) (0.0162) (0.0198) (0.0115) (0.00843) 
LN_CORR
UPTION -0.242*** -0.221*** -0.221*** -0.160*** -0.197*** -0.377*** -0.216*** -0.0617** 
 (0.0671) (0.0673) (0.0343) (0.0364) (0.0594) (0.0723) (0.0428) (0.0304) 
LN_DEM
OCRATI 
CACCOU
NTABILIT
Y 
-0.131 -0.115 -0.0312 -0.0770 -0.0945 -0.0334 -0.107* 0.0696* 
 (0.0895) (0.0897) (0.0469) (0.0486) (0.0811) (0.0987) (0.0570) (0.0418) 
LN_LAW
&ORDER 0.0417 0.0357 -0.165*** -0.0915 -0.0422 -0.243* -0.0961 -0.0212 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.0602) (0.0607) (0.104) (0.127) (0.0713) (0.0548) 
LN_MILI
TARY IN 
POLITICS 
-0.0941 -0.0905 -0.240*** -0.0509 -0.0626 0.119 -0.0419 -0.0522 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.0475) (0.0598) (0.0831) (0.1000) (0.0702) (0.0427) 
LN_INTE
RNAL 
CONFLIC
T 
0.249* 0.235 0.221*** 0.0272 0.260* 0.0819 0.111 0.0958 
 (0.148) (0.148) (0.0767) (0.0803) (0.133) (0.162) (0.0943) (0.0683) 
LN_ETHN
IC 
TENSION
S 
-0.0796 -0.108 -0.0461 -0.0885* -0.0453 -0.126 -0.0714 0.0456 
 (0.0986) (0.0987) (0.0523) (0.0534) (0.0904) (0.110) (0.0627) (0.0477) 
CONSTAN
T 1.275** 1.287** 2.492*** 3.000*** 0.754 1.748*** 2.354*** 3.494*** 
 (0.572) (0.574) (0.293) (0.310) (0.507) (0.617) (0.364) (0.264) 
OBSERVA
TIONS 706 706 784 712 783 783 712 734 
R-
SQUARED 0.118 0.117 0.268 0.147 0.143 0.072 0.188 0.056 
NO. OF 
COUNTR
Y 
67 67 74 67 74 74 67 72 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4 FDI on Financial development 1998-2011 (ICRG) 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LN_FDI 0.0940*** 0.0867*** 0.0343*** 0.0254** 0.0717*** -0.00736 0.0391*** 0.0481*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0208) (0.0106) (0.0113) (0.0180) (0.0220) (0.0134) (0.00922) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.395*** 0.419*** 0.370*** 0.274*** 0.526*** 0.151 0.354*** 0.0824* 
 (0.107) (0.108) (0.0560) (0.0585) (0.0947) (0.116) (0.0692) (0.0486) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0445** -0.0432** -0.0186* -0.0126 -0.0464*** 0.0170 -0.0197 -0.00133 
 (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.00991) (0.0102) (0.0168) (0.0206) (0.0121) (0.00858) 
LN_CORR
UPTION -0.271*** -0.253*** -0.244*** -0.180*** -0.219*** -0.389*** -0.245*** -0.0530* 
 (0.0672) (0.0675) (0.0353) (0.0370) (0.0597) (0.0730) (0.0437) (0.0302) 
LN_DEM
OCRATI 
CACCOU
NTABILIT
Y 
-0.123 -0.106 -0.0258 -0.0560 -0.109 -0.0323 -0.0866 0.0497 
 (0.0888) (0.0891) (0.0480) (0.0489) (0.0811) (0.0991) (0.0578) (0.0411) 
LN_LAW
&ORDER 0.0267 0.0197 -0.177*** -0.0943 -0.0468 -0.274** -0.104 -0.0258 
 (0.115) (0.116) (0.0632) (0.0628) (0.107) (0.131) (0.0743) (0.0554) 
LN_MILI
TARY IN 
POLITICS 
-0.122 -0.122 -0.254*** -0.0714 -0.0489 0.0793 -0.0632 -0.0245 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.0487) (0.0614) (0.0834) (0.101) (0.0726) (0.0421) 
LN_INTE
RNAL 
CONFLIC
T 
0.350*** 0.334** 0.209*** 0.0203 0.365*** 0.223 0.122 0.222*** 
 (0.133) (0.134) (0.0715) (0.0734) (0.121) (0.148) (0.0868) (0.0610) 
LN_ETHN
IC 
TENSION
S 
-0.122 -0.152 -0.0702 -0.113** -0.0937 -0.134 -0.107* 0.0135 
 (0.0985) (0.0989) (0.0537) (0.0541) (0.0908) (0.111) (0.0640) (0.0471) 
CONSTAN
T 1.335** 1.329** 2.480*** 2.896*** 0.795 1.269** 2.207*** 3.510*** 
 (0.563) (0.565) (0.297) (0.309) (0.503) (0.614) (0.365) (0.258) 
OBSERVA
TIONS 709 709 789 715 788 788 715 740 
R-
SQUARED 0.119 0.114 0.236 0.129 0.136 0.069 0.153 0.092 
NO.OF 
COUNTR
Y 
 
68 68 75 68 75 75 68 73 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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② Fixed effect estimation with WGI 
 
The most of test results are coherent with previous estimations with ICRG indictors. 
The main difference is the number of observations and country are more than 1000 
and 100 respectively. This provides us more generalized results rather than previous 
tests. The effect of three different resources of foreign capital inflows on financial 
sectors are shown in table 5, 6, 7. 
The logged ODA is negative and statistically significant at 1% significance level to all 
the financial depth and efficiency indicators except for credit to government and state 
owned enterprises. In contrast, the percentage changes of remittances and foreign 
direct investment positive and statistically significant at 1% significance level to all 
the financial depth and efficiency indicators. 
Different with previous regression results with ICRG, in this regression the rule of 
law has significant impact on financial sector development. This results proves 
previous research that emphasized the property right and contract enforcement in 
financial development. 
Based on both estimation results with ICRG and WGI, we can conclude that the 
increased level of ODA to GDP may harmful to develop financial sector in developing 
countries. On the other hand, remittances and foreign direct investment promote the 
financial development in developing countries.  
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Table 5 ODA on Financial development 1998-2011 (WGI) 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LN_ODA -0.116*** -0.0678*** -0.0550*** -0.0579*** -0.113*** -0.0526* -0.0575*** -0.0470***
 (0.0193) (0.0228) (0.0112) (0.0128) (0.0163) (0.0285) (0.0131) (0.0101) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.515*** 0.338*** 0.442*** 0.429*** 0.499*** 0.113 0.470*** 0.232*** 
 (0.0674) (0.0801) (0.0365) (0.0448) (0.0531) (0.0945) (0.0458) (0.0325) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0266** -0.0256* -0.0197*** -0.0213** -0.0131 -0.0167 -0.0267*** 0.00106 
 (0.0130) (0.0154) (0.00721) (0.00864) (0.0105) (0.0185) (0.00878) (0.00642) 
WGI_VOI
CEANDA
CCOUNT
ABILITY 
-0.0168 -0.0878 -0.00264 0.0782* 0.0454 0.0988 -0.00347 0.0897*** 
 (0.0622) (0.0742) (0.0332) (0.0414) (0.0482) (0.0844) (0.0424) (0.0298) 
WGI_POL
ITICALST
ABILITY
ANDABSE
NCE 
0.0914** 0.0336 0.0295 0.0338 0.0679** -0.175*** 0.0243 0.0929*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0472) (0.0212) (0.0263) (0.0308) (0.0543) (0.0270) (0.0188) 
WGI_GO
VERNME
NTEFFEC
TIVENES
S 
-0.0259 0.0575 0.177*** 0.0273 0.0542 -0.104 0.149** -0.0247 
 (0.0841) (0.103) (0.0480) (0.0560) (0.0697) (0.122) (0.0589) (0.0439) 
WGI_REG
ULATOR
YQUALIT
Y 
0.0652 0.237*** -0.0966*** -0.0624 0.0661 0.0203 0.0334 0.0424 
 (0.0682) (0.0826) (0.0373) (0.0453) (0.0543) (0.0966) (0.0472) (0.0336) 
WGI_RUL
EOFLAW 0.215*** 0.224** 0.0874* 0.133** 0.0944 0.455*** 0.124** 0.0447 
 (0.0788) (0.0937) (0.0456) (0.0525) (0.0664) (0.117) (0.0536) (0.0411) 
WGI_CO
NTROLO
FCORRU
PTION 
0.0724 -0.0949 -0.0827** -0.0266 -0.000886 -0.230** -0.102** -0.0115 
 (0.0667) (0.0797) (0.0372) (0.0444) (0.0541) (0.0949) (0.0456) (0.0336) 
CONSTA
NT 0.574* 1.534*** 1.615*** 1.573*** 0.700*** 0.871** 1.169*** 3.254*** 
 (0.303) (0.360) (0.168) (0.201) (0.244) (0.434) (0.206) (0.149) 
OBSERVA
TIONS 1,173 1,161 1,402 1,169 1,397 1,371 1,159 1,323 
R-
SQUARE
D 
0.120 0.059 0.138 0.127 0.123 0.027 0.140 0.117 
NO.OF 
COUNTR
Y 
100 99 119 99 118 116 99 114 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 Remittances on Financial development 1998-2011 (WGI) 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LN_REMI
TTANCES 0.0487*** 0.0641*** 0.0499*** 0.0292*** 0.0529*** 0.0767*** 0.0478*** 0.0207*** 
(0.0132) (0.0164) (0.00789) (0.00810) (0.0125) (0.0197) (0.00930) (0.00637) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.535*** 0.440*** 0.372*** 0.322*** 0.543*** 0.0644 0.406*** 0.243*** 
(0.0715) (0.0892) (0.0403) (0.0440) (0.0639) (0.102) (0.0504) (0.0329) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0275** -0.0287* -0.0228*** -0.0181** -0.0238** -0.00554 -0.0234*** -0.000834 
(0.0126) (0.0158) (0.00734) (0.00780) (0.0116) (0.0184) (0.00892) (0.00602) 
WGI_VOI
CEANDA
CCOUNT
ABILITY 
-0.0888 -0.107 -0.0519 -0.0279 -0.00355 0.117 -0.0659 0.0952*** 
(0.0605) (0.0758) (0.0331) (0.0373) (0.0524) (0.0827) (0.0429) (0.0272) 
WGI_POL
ITICALST
ABILITY
ANDABSE
NCE 
0.0615 0.0465 0.00872 0.00342 0.0432 -0.232*** 0.0241 0.0597*** 
(0.0388) (0.0485) (0.0215) (0.0239) (0.0341) (0.0540) (0.0275) (0.0174) 
WGI_GO
VERNME
NTEFFEC
TIVENES
S 
0.0983 0.0720 0.191*** 0.139*** 0.145* -0.0454 0.164*** 0.0246 
(0.0808) (0.102) (0.0485) (0.0499) (0.0769) (0.121) (0.0577) (0.0403) 
WGI_REG
ULATOR
YQUALIT
Y 
0.282*** 0.270*** -0.0615 0.0288 0.159*** -0.0349 0.0736 0.125*** 
(0.0667) (0.0839) (0.0384) (0.0411) (0.0609) (0.0969) (0.0475) (0.0314) 
WGI_RUL
EOFLAW 0.338*** 0.364*** 0.152*** 0.183*** 0.252*** 0.450*** 0.231*** 0.0616 
(0.0765) (0.0957) (0.0452) (0.0472) (0.0717) (0.114) (0.0541) (0.0375) 
WGI_CON
TROLOF
CORRUP
TION 
-0.0378 -0.0680 -0.110*** -0.123*** -0.0486 -0.242** -0.145*** -0.0655** 
(0.0660) (0.0824) (0.0381) (0.0407) (0.0603) (0.0951) (0.0467) (0.0314) 
CONSTAN
T 1.037*** 1.438*** 2.133*** 2.264*** 1.066*** 1.253*** 1.683*** 3.401*** 
(0.307) (0.383) (0.174) (0.189) (0.276) (0.440) (0.217) (0.142) 
OBSERVA
TIONS 1,175 1,171 1,370 1,177 1,365 1,350 1,175 1,285 
R-
SQUARED 0.149 0.091 0.130 0.104 0.123 0.043 0.139 0.122 
NUMBER 
OF 
COUNTR
YCODE 
102 101 119 101 118 118 101 114 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7 FDI on Financial development 1998-2011 (WGI) 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LN_FDI 0.0597*** 0.0467*** 0.0390*** 0.0267*** 0.0468*** -0.0153 0.0300*** 0.0343*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0159) (0.00717) (0.00835) (0.0111) (0.0176) (0.00907) (0.00622) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.446*** 0.342*** 0.354*** 0.390*** 0.435*** 0.136 0.449*** 0.169*** 
 (0.0737) (0.0877) (0.0388) (0.0459) (0.0602) (0.0963) (0.0498) (0.0335) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0298** -0.0274* -0.0214*** -0.0238*** -0.0139 -0.00413 -0.0277*** -0.000296 
 (0.0132) (0.0157) (0.00725) (0.00831) (0.0113) (0.0180) (0.00895) (0.00629) 
WGI_VOI
CEANDA
CCOUNT
ABILITY 
-0.109* -0.193** -0.0437 0.00983 -0.0426 0.112 -0.0724 0.0676** 
 (0.0647) (0.0774) (0.0337) (0.0406) (0.0525) (0.0833) (0.0441) (0.0294) 
WGI_POL
ITICALST
ABILITY
ANDABSE
NCE 
0.0684* 0.0202 0.0282 0.0363 0.0320 -0.193*** 0.0392 0.0837*** 
 (0.0408) (0.0486) (0.0213) (0.0255) (0.0331) (0.0528) (0.0277) (0.0184) 
WGI_GO
VERNME
NTEFFEC
TIVENES
S 
0.0625 0.0637 0.202*** 0.117** 0.139* -0.125 0.168*** 0.000445 
 (0.0856) (0.104) (0.0482) (0.0537) (0.0748) (0.119) (0.0593) (0.0425) 
WGI_REG
ULATOR
YQUALIT
Y 
0.173** 0.327*** -0.116*** -0.0342 0.109* -0.0191 0.0556 0.0399 
 (0.0688) (0.0833) (0.0365) (0.0431) (0.0578) (0.0930) (0.0475) (0.0319) 
WGI_RUL
EOFLAW 0.307*** 0.354*** 0.160*** 0.198*** 0.208*** 0.511*** 0.230*** 0.0503 
 (0.0807) (0.0961) (0.0453) (0.0506) (0.0710) (0.113) (0.0547) (0.0397) 
WGI_CO
NTROLO
FCORRU
PTION 
0.0109 -0.0734 -0.0931** -0.0947** -0.0220 -0.217** -0.120** -0.0234 
 (0.0689) (0.0819) (0.0378) (0.0432) (0.0587) (0.0932) (0.0467) (0.0329) 
CONSTA
NT 1.333*** 1.811*** 2.182*** 1.963*** 1.429*** 0.979** 1.485*** 3.668*** 
 (0.315) (0.374) (0.168) (0.196) (0.261) (0.417) (0.213) (0.145) 
 
OBSERVA
TIONS 1,210 1,201 1,450 1,212 1,439 1,415 1,205 1,366 
R-
SQUARE
D 
0.128 0.088 0.140 0.137 0.116 0.030 0.158 0.120 
NUMBER 
OF 
COUNTR
YCODE 
105 104 124 104 123 121 104 119 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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③ Fixed effect estimation by income levels 
In order to explore the role of each foreign capital inflow more specifically, the 
regression model tests the different income levels and the summarized results are 
shown on table 8.  
For the low income countries, the remittances and FDI positively affect to some of 
financial sectors, such as liquid liabilities, domestic credits and deposit money bank’s 
asset.  
In the lower middle income countries results shows stark differences among ODA, 
remittances and FDI. The results aligned with trend of remittances inflows in recent 
years. Therefore, the financial sector development in lower-middle income countries 
will be promoted by both remittance and FDI.  
Despite of relatively high share of FDI in upper-middle income countries, it does not 
shows any statistically significant results. On the contrary, the ODA inflows in upper 
middle income countries definitely hamper the financial development. 
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Table 8 WGI, Fixed effect estimation by income level 1998-2011 
 LOW LOWER-MIDDLE UPPER-MIDDLE 
 ODA 
Remittance
s FDI ODA 
Remittance
s FDI ODA 
Remittance
s FDI 
DEPTH (1) -0.211*** 0.0474* 0.0102 -0.136*** 0.191*** 0.137*** -0.0621*** -0.00679 0.00530 
 (0.0663) (0.0278) (0.0180) (0.0355) (0.0274) (0.0238) (0.0219) (0.0161) (0.0260) 
DEPTH (2) -0.223*** 0.0370 0.0130 -0.0248 0.266*** 0.0975*** -0.0609*** -0.00792 -0.00472 
 (0.0648) (0.0270) (0.0176) (0.0482) (0.0418) (0.0347) (0.0219) (0.0164) (0.0264) 
DEPTH (3) -0.0341 0.0848*** 0.0280** -0.0363** 0.150*** 0.0492*** -0.0644*** 0.00264 0.0184 
 (0.0479) (0.0190) (0.0127) (0.0158) (0.0140) (0.0114) (0.0134) (0.00999) (0.0139) 
DEPTH (4) -0.0354 0.0280 0.00121 -0.0699*** 0.143*** 0.0571*** -0.0342** -0.0125 -0.00155 
 (0.0446) (0.0176) (0.0113) (0.0227) (0.0149) (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0104) (0.0164) 
DEPTH (5) -0.131** 0.0665*** 0.0272* -0.132*** 0.198*** 0.104*** -0.0933*** -0.00349 -0.00926 
 (0.0551) (0.0242) (0.0151) (0.0296) (0.0275) (0.0209) (0.0194) (0.0160) (0.0225) 
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 0.0405 0.290*** 0.0272 0.0374 0.151*** -0.0863*** -0.0993*** -0.0231 -0.0455 
 (0.114) (0.0517) (0.0309) (0.0458) (0.0420) (0.0303) (0.0351) (0.0216) (0.0329) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 0.0143 0.0395* 0.00345 -0.0663*** 0.187*** 0.0594*** -0.0464*** -0.00372 -0.00254 
 (0.0518) (0.0205) (0.0134) (0.0210) (0.0184) (0.0160) (0.0158) (0.0111) (0.0172) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) -0.0820* 0.0553*** 0.0444*** -0.0658*** 0.0731*** 0.0398*** -0.0346*** -0.00764 0.0115 
 (0.0423) (0.0193) (0.0117) (0.0178) (0.0137) (0.0127) (0.00787) (0.00464) (0.00723) 
AVG. 
OBSERVA
TION 
314 253 253 509 502 423 447 503 518 
AVG. NO. 
OF 
COUNTR
Y 
27 26 26 42 42 42 39 44 44 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3) 2004 - 2011 
Lastly, in order to test the relationship between foreign financial flows and financial 
breadth, the 3 different independent variables and the 2 years lagged variables are 
hired as shown in model (3) and (4). The summarized empirical results are shown in 
table 9. 
Even though the most of ODA on financial sectors are focused on increasing financial 
accessibility, the results show increasing percentage of ODA to GDP hinders 
widening financial breadth. On the other hand, the remittances and FDI promotes the 
financial accessibility with statistically significant at 1% significance level.  
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Table 9 Financial breadth 2004-2011 
 
LN_NO_OF_BANK 
BRANCHES PER 100,000 
ADULTS 
LN_NO_OF_ATMS 
PER 100,000 ADULTS 
AVG. NO. 
OBSERVATION / 
COUNTRY 
LN_ODA -0.0842*** -0.248*** 596 
 (0.0223) (0.0599) 84 
2 YRS LAGGED LN_ODA -0.0540** -0.186*** 441 
 (0.0236) (0.0603) 83 
LN_REMITTANCES 0.0222 0.145*** 584 
 (0.0173) (0.0445) 84 
2 YRS LAGGED 
LN_REMITTANCES 0.0136 0.143*** 432 
 (0.0131) (0.0399) 82 
LN_FDI 0.0483*** 0.139*** 624 
 (0.0157) (0.0331) 88 
2 YRS LAGGED LN_FDI 0.0439*** 0.137*** 462 
 (0.0129) (0.0300) 86 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATION 
This paper examines that the Official Development Assistance which is not 
highlighted by financial development literature is associated with financial 
development using panel data analysis. In addition, in order to have more 
comprehensive results and policy implication, the other major foreign capital inflows 
in developing countries, particularly remittances and FDI hired additional explanatory 
variables. The research questions basically rely on the assumption that financial 
development is a source of economic growth. In other words, if the ODA promote 
financial development, we can indirectly prove the role of ODA in economic 
development. 
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However, the results of all the ODA regressions are consistent as the percentage 
changes of ODA to GDP negatively associated with most of financial development 
indicators. On the other hand, remittances and Foreign Direct Investment positively 
affect financial depth, efficiency and breadth. The contradictory results can be 
interpreted with financial depth and efficiency in financial development.  
Firstly, because the typical ODA flows from donor government to recipient 
government, the level of financial depth highly depends on whether the recipient 
government allocates the ODA money efficiently. In addition, as Aid Watch (2013) 
claimed, officially released data of disbursed ODA does not mean actual flowed 
amount to recipient countries. Therefore, the possibility to spend the ODA money in 
donor countries cannot promote the financial development. On the other hand, the 
remittances and FDI that are directly transferred to commercial banks in developing 
countries may contribute deepening financial sectors. 
Secondly, as described in data, compare to private sectors the government works less 
efficiently in financial market by providing credit without evaluations or collaterals. 
This is aligned with predominant perceptions on public sectors. as the remittances and 
FDI inflows into commercial banks, the banks will be more efficiently channelling or 
allocating credits, and monitoring projects.  
In conclusion, this paper emphasizes the role private flows and commercial banks in 
financial development. Most of all, the ODA money should be channelled and 
allocated more efficiently and using private financial intermediaries will be a way to 
contributes financial development. Additionally, comprehensive investigation and 
transparent reporting on flow of ODA are required to maximize effectiveness of ODA 
for better financial system. 
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Appendix 1 List of countries 
(Depends on the availability of variables, the number of observed countries for each test is differ) 
Low-income economies Lower-middle-income economies Upper-middle-income economies
Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gambia, The 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Haiti 
Kenya 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Sierra Leone 
Somalia 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zimbabwe 
Albania 
Armenia 
Belize 
Bhutan 
Bolivia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Congo, Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Djibouti 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Fiji 
Georgia 
Ghana 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Iraq 
Kiribati 
Kosovo 
Lao PDR 
Lesotho 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 
Moldova 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Nicaragua 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Samoa 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Solomon Islands 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Timor-Leste 
Tonga 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
Vanuatu 
Vietnam 
West Bank and Gaza 
Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia
Algeria 
Angola 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Gabon 
Grenada 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Macedonia, FYR 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Montenegro 
Namibia 
Palau 
Panama 
Peru 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Serbia 
Seychelles 
South Africa 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Tuvalu 
Uruguay 
Venezuela, RB 
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Appendix 2 . Summary Statistics of Variables 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
YEAR 1988 2004.5 4.032143 1998 2011 
      
REMITTANCE~P 1596 5.474405 7.767554 .000029 61.9926 
TOTAL_ODA_~P 1821 .0856555 .1249875 -.0248398 1.471753 
FDIGDP 1873 4.642712 6.531708 -16.58887 91.00733 
      
      
NO_OF_BANK 904 12.41827 12.83166 .2921958 92.68103 
NO_OF_ATMS 791 20.17809 21.27836 0 152.9377 
 
PRIVATE CREDIT 1 1630 27.6078 24.07159 .551347 165.8018 
PRIVATE CREDIT 2 1626 29.20497 26.22688 .0107454 165.8018 
M2GDP 1988 40.97747 33.5649 0 243.94 
LIQUIDLIABILITY 1642 40.80206 27.8957 4.129019 220.7701 
DOMESTICCR~P 1782 31.08191 27.24119 .7735366 167.536 
 
CREDITTOGO 1703 8.230619 9.751526 .005 73.537 
BANKDEPOSI~P 1634 33.33107 24.79358 1.690645 212.9586 
      
TRADEGDP 1836 82.15657 37.34552 .3088029 223.0641 
INFLATION 1988 13.12791 105.7937 -32.81 3789.21 
      
BUREAUCRACY 
QUALITY 1246 1.601525 .8144809 0 3 
CORRUPTION 1246 2.14687 .7898059 0 5 
DEMOCRATIC 1246 3.512039 1.585405 0 6 
ETHNICTENSION 1246 3.748796 1.34265 0 6 
EXTERNALCONFLICT 1246 9.649679 1.59903 1.5 12 
GOVERNMENT 
STABILITY 1246 8.746388 1.650814 3 12 
INTERNALCONFLICT 1246 8.634029 1.808529 0 12 
INVESTMENT 
PROFILE 1246 7.553371 2.03537 0 11.5 
LAW AND ORDER 1246 3.174157 1.093687 .5 6 
MILITARY IN 
POLITICS 1246 3.079053 1.623983 0 6 
RELIGIOUS TENSION 1246 4.405698 1.417099 0 6 
SOCIOECONOMIC 
CONDITIONS 1246 4.220305 1.814993 0 10 
ICRGPOLITI~L 1246 60.47191 10.2435 22 82.5 
      
WGI_VOICEA~Y 1984 -.3902637 .84261 -2.284278 1.307063 
WGI_POLITI~E 1938 -.4087923 .9328858 -3.323905 1.539997 
WGI_GOVERN~S 1957 -.5101798 .6352572 -2.450037 1.261179 
WGI_REGULA~Y 1956 -.4888852 .7285212 -2.675439 1.53563 
WGI_RULEOF~W 1976 -.5115492 .7021046 -2.668873 1.379328 
WGI_CONTRO~N 1962 -.500254 .6108439 -1.924046 1.553228 
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Appendix 3 ODA and ICRG 1984-2011 
VARIABLES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5) EFFICIENCY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LN_ODA -0.0730*** -0.0677*** -0.0778*** -0.0226** -0.0792*** -0.118*** -0.0408*** -0.0554***
(0.0156) (0.0157) (0.00932) (0.0111) (0.0136) (0.0256) (0.0117) (0.00921) 
LN_TRADE 0.0953 0.137** 0.299*** 0.264*** 0.147*** 0.203** 0.301*** 0.126*** 
(0.0597) (0.0598) (0.0340) (0.0427) (0.0484) (0.0931) (0.0443) (0.0314) 
LN_INFLATIO
N -0.0650*** -0.0670*** -0.0224*** -0.0710*** -0.0289*** 0.0228 -0.0765*** -0.00492 
(0.0121) (0.0120) (0.00706) (0.00828) (0.0103) (0.0192) (0.00871) (0.00665) 
LN_CORRUPTI
ON 0.00947 0.0350 -0.0388 0.0144 0.0187 -0.353*** -0.0110 -0.0608** 
(0.0494) (0.0492) (0.0299) (0.0342) (0.0435) (0.0802) (0.0357) (0.0277) 
LN_DEMOCRA
TICACCOUNT
ABILITY 
-0.00698 0.00338 -0.0212 0.0320 -0.0358 0.192** 0.0707* 0.172*** 
(0.0528) (0.0527) (0.0305) (0.0364) (0.0443) (0.0846) (0.0382) (0.0300) 
LN_LAW&ORD
ER -0.152** -0.0776 -0.106*** -0.108*** -0.0549 -0.189** -0.136*** 0.0231 
(0.0593) (0.0578) (0.0342) (0.0400) (0.0509) (0.0936) (0.0420) (0.0330) 
LN_MILITARY 
INPOLITICS 0.00473 0.00140 -0.0546 -0.00262 -0.0610 -0.185* -0.0369 -0.0831** 
(0.0573) (0.0572) (0.0350) (0.0394) (0.0509) (0.0959) (0.0416) (0.0338) 
LN_INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 0.106 0.0910 -0.0306 0.00729 0.0444 -0.503*** 0.101** -0.0649* 
(0.0681) (0.0679) (0.0400) (0.0476) (0.0579) (0.108) (0.0499) (0.0368) 
LN_ETHNICT 
ENSIONS 0.234*** 0.188*** 0.0777* 0.0612 0.192*** -0.141 0.188*** 0.0722* 
(0.0684) (0.0684) (0.0416) (0.0479) (0.0600) (0.111) (0.0501) (0.0407) 
FRLAW -0.266* -0.288* -0.0970 -0.0715 -0.282** -0.222 -0.176 0.0353 
(0.159) (0.167) (0.0884) (0.140) (0.121) (0.229) (0.145) (0.0697) 
INI_LN_PRIVA
TE CREDIT 0.511***        
(0.0992) 
INI_LN_PRIVA
TE CREDIT2  0.558***       
(0.102) 
INI_LN_M2 0.560*** 
(0.0754) 
INI_LN_LIQUI
D LIABILITIES    0.519***     
(0.102) 
INI_LN_DOME
STIC CREDIT     0.659***    
(0.0784) 
INI_LN_CREDI
T TO GOV'T&      0.436***   
(0.0665) 
INI_LN_BANK 
DEPOSITS       0.477***  
(0.0981) 
INI_LN_PRIVA
TEVS 
CENTRAL        
0.420*** 
(0.0704) 
CONSTANT 0.773* 0.488 0.460 0.750* 0.289 1.453*** 0.340 1.758*** 
(0.408) (0.421) (0.298) (0.404) (0.326) (0.506) (0.376) (0.317) 
OBSERVATIO
NS 851 856 1,013 837 988 1,007 855 975 
NO.OF 
COUNTRY 47 47 56 46 55 57 47 56 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Appendix 4 2 years lagged ODA and ICRG 1984-2011 
VARIABLES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5) EFFICIENCY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN_ODA -0.0959*** -0.0927*** -0.0923*** -0.0371*** -0.0887*** -0.167*** -0.0606*** -0.0467*** 
(0.0158) (0.0159) (0.00893) (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0252) (0.0117) (0.00926) 
LN_TRADE 0.0505 0.0940 0.329*** 0.295*** 0.125** 0.272*** 0.321*** 0.127*** 
(0.0611) (0.0614) (0.0336) (0.0418) (0.0501) (0.0949) (0.0451) (0.0331) 
LN_INFLATION -0.0660*** -0.0695*** -0.0207*** -0.0656*** -0.0304*** 0.0323* -0.0736*** -0.00568 
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.00686) (0.00812) (0.0105) (0.0194) (0.00893) (0.00694) 
LN_CORRUPTI
ON 0.000638 0.0304 -0.0235 0.0297 0.00825 -0.333*** 0.00352 -0.0683** 
(0.0492) (0.0492) (0.0285) (0.0327) (0.0437) (0.0796) (0.0356) (0.0285) 
LN_DEMOCRA
TICACCOUNTA
BILITY 
0.0382 0.0548 -0.0221 0.0489 -0.0140 0.187** 0.0775** 0.184*** 
(0.0534) (0.0534) (0.0295) (0.0354) (0.0452) (0.0853) (0.0387) (0.0313) 
LN_LAW&ORD
ER -0.129** -0.0390 -0.0875*** -0.0902** -0.0275 -0.163* -0.134*** 0.0335 
(0.0599) (0.0582) (0.0332) (0.0387) (0.0523) (0.0944) (0.0421) (0.0344) 
LN_MILITARY 
INPOLITICS -0.00857 0.00309 -0.0613* -0.0502 -0.0473 -0.164* -0.0569 -0.0929*** 
(0.0596) (0.0594) (0.0345) (0.0392) (0.0529) (0.0983) (0.0432) (0.0357) 
LN_INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 0.102 0.106 -0.0229 -0.00632 0.0469 -0.443*** 0.0947* -0.0514 
(0.0688) (0.0688) (0.0392) (0.0454) (0.0599) (0.110) (0.0497) (0.0388) 
LN_ETHNICT 
ENSIONS 0.229*** 0.188*** 0.0940** 0.0893* 0.193*** -0.0751 0.193*** 0.0719* 
(0.0687) (0.0688) (0.0401) (0.0458) (0.0609) (0.112) (0.0502) (0.0418) 
FRLAW -0.286* -0.308* -0.107 -0.0851 -0.292** -0.271 -0.189 0.0438 
(0.163) (0.171) (0.0928) (0.143) (0.127) (0.234) (0.147) (0.0704) 
INI_LN_PRIVA
TE CREDIT 0.493***        
(0.102) 
INI_LN_PRIVA
TE CREDIT2  0.534***       
(0.104) 
INI_LN_M2 0.529*** 
(0.0794) 
INI_LN_LIQUID 
LIABILITIES    0.500***     
(0.104) 
INI_LN_DOMES
TIC CREDIT     0.642***    
(0.0821) 
INI_LN_CREDI
T TO GOV'T&      0.413***   
(0.0682) 
INI_LN_BANKD
EPOSITS       0.457***  
(0.0995) 
INI_LN_PRIVA
TEVSCENTRAL        0.425*** 
(0.0712) 
CONSTANT 0.882** 0.509 0.338 0.623 0.333 0.757 0.250 1.734*** 
(0.420) (0.433) (0.311) (0.409) (0.341) (0.520) (0.380) (0.324) 
OBSERVATION
S 812 817 968 799 943 963 817 932 
NO.OF 
COUNTRY 47 47 56 46 55 57 47 56 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 5 Remittances and ICRG 1984-2011 
VARIABLES DEPTH (1) 
DEPTH 
(2) 
DEPTH 
(3) 
DEPTH 
(4) 
DEPTH 
(5) 
EFFICIENCY 
(1) 
EFFICIENCY 
(2) 
EFFICIENCY 
(3) 
LN_REMITTANCE 0.00587 0.0102 0.0256*** 0.0146 0.0218* 0.106*** 0.00452 0.0482*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.00806) (0.0106) (0.0129) (0.0237) (0.0111) (0.00751) 
LN_TRADE 0.0538 0.115* 0.346*** 0.285*** 0.116** 0.294*** 0.352*** 0.0767** 
 (0.0676) (0.0678) (0.0372) (0.0460) (0.0576) (0.107) (0.0476) (0.0338) 
LN_INFLATION -0.0756*** -0.0771*** -0.0304*** -0.0717*** -0.0343*** -0.00802 -0.0778*** -0.0275*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.00708) (0.00816) (0.0110) (0.0197) (0.00856) (0.00655) 
LN_CORRUPTION -0.0938* -0.0620 -0.115*** 0.0166 -0.0610 -0.491*** -0.0349 -0.0857*** 
 (0.0483) (0.0484) (0.0279) (0.0328) (0.0432) (0.0773) (0.0340) (0.0257) 
LN_DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 0.0222 0.0226 -0.00628 0.0444 -0.0391 0.222*** 0.101*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0541) (0.0543) (0.0297) (0.0365) (0.0462) (0.0851) (0.0381) (0.0288) 
LN_LAW&ORDER -0.128** -0.0488 -0.0700** -0.118*** -0.0226 -0.00885 -0.150*** 0.0854*** 
 (0.0612) (0.0599) (0.0332) (0.0402) (0.0529) (0.0933) (0.0421) (0.0315) 
LN_MILITARY 
INPOLITICS -0.0829 -0.0728 -0.0200 0.0678 -0.0953* -0.256** 0.0106 -0.136*** 
 (0.0627) (0.0627) (0.0364) (0.0420) (0.0565) (0.103) (0.0441) (0.0343) 
LN_INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 0.200*** 0.191*** 0.0872** 0.0358 0.0923 -0.213* 0.159*** 0.0274 
 (0.0686) (0.0688) (0.0401) (0.0464) (0.0622) (0.112) (0.0484) (0.0354) 
LN_ETHNICT 
ENSIONS 0.365*** 0.307*** 0.0892** 0.0259 0.291*** 0.0446 0.177*** 0.142*** 
 (0.0699) (0.0698) (0.0404) (0.0470) (0.0625) (0.113) (0.0493) (0.0395) 
CONSTANT 2.440*** 2.216*** 2.219*** 2.353*** 2.548*** 1.326** 1.499*** 3.738*** 
 (0.325) (0.324) (0.184) (0.220) (0.287) (0.520) (0.228) (0.160) 
         
OBSERVATIONS 824 830 991 812 948 956 829 941 
R-SQUARED 0.114 0.109 0.220 0.211 0.059 0.140 0.267 0.195 
NO.OF COUNTRY 47 47 57 46 55 57 47 57 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 6 2 Yeas lagged Remittances and ICRG 1984-2011 
VARIABLES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5) EFFICIENCY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN_REMIT
TANCE -0.0169 -0.0118 0.0172** -0.00416 0.0140 0.0951*** -0.00472 0.0470*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0148) (0.00761) (0.00955) (0.0125) (0.0231) (0.0105) (0.00707) 
LN_TRADE 0.0602 0.131* 0.398*** 0.337*** 0.129** 0.409*** 0.385*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0688) (0.0692) (0.0372) (0.0449) (0.0593) (0.111) (0.0490) (0.0344) 
LN_INFLATION -0.0749*** -0.0791*** -0.0267*** -0.0667*** -0.0304*** -0.00802 -0.0763*** -0.0248*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.00696) (0.00797) (0.0112) (0.0200) (0.00879) (0.00639) 
LN_CORRUPTION -0.125** -0.0869* -0.101*** 0.00553 -0.0846* -0.430*** -0.0440 -0.0666*** 
 (0.0484) (0.0486) (0.0274) (0.0315) (0.0437) (0.0784) (0.0345) (0.0250) 
LN_DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILIT
Y 
0.0497 0.0560 0.0244 0.0579 -0.000287 0.207** 0.104*** 0.153*** 
 (0.0562) (0.0565) (0.0300) (0.0363) (0.0481) (0.0891) (0.0399) (0.0291) 
LN_LAW&ORDER -0.162*** -0.0615 -0.0835** -0.111*** -0.0346 -0.0465 -0.159*** 0.0617** 
 (0.0627) (0.0611) (0.0333) (0.0393) (0.0549) (0.0962) (0.0432) (0.0314) 
LN_MILITARY 
INPOLITICS -0.131** -0.0995 -0.0564 0.00521 -0.134** -0.177 -0.0250 -0.113*** 
 (0.0652) (0.0654) (0.0368) (0.0418) (0.0591) (0.108) (0.0463) (0.0345) 
LN_INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 0.215*** 0.222*** 0.0725* 0.0374 0.115* -0.305*** 0.164*** 0.0115 
 (0.0690) (0.0695) (0.0395) (0.0447) (0.0631) (0.114) (0.0491) (0.0349) 
LN_ETHNICT 
ENSIONS 0.369*** 0.318*** 0.101*** 0.0482 0.287*** 0.0249 0.179*** 0.129*** 
 (0.0702) (0.0703) (0.0392) (0.0451) (0.0627) (0.113) (0.0500) (0.0382) 
CONSTANT 2.469*** 2.105*** 2.027*** 2.165*** 2.485*** 0.983* 1.412*** 3.689*** 
 (0.331) (0.330) (0.183) (0.214) (0.294) (0.536) (0.234) (0.162) 
    
OBSERVATIONS 781 787 936 771 895 903 786 889 
R-SQUARED 0.123 0.122 0.242 0.218 0.064 0.144 0.270 0.192 
NO.OF COUNTRY 47 47 57 46 55 57 47 57 
 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 7 FDI and ICRG 1984-2011 
VARIABLES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5) EFFICIENCY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LN_FDI -0.00957 -0.00683 0.0105 0.00911 -0.00133 0.0225 0.0185** 0.0102 
(0.0122) (0.0118) (0.00710) (0.00824) (0.0112) (0.0188) (0.00858) (0.00641) 
LN_TRADE 0.120* 0.169*** 0.338*** 0.266*** 0.171*** 0.313*** 0.295*** 0.0954*** 
(0.0625) (0.0625) (0.0379) (0.0434) (0.0541) (0.101) (0.0453) (0.0339) 
LN_INFLATION -0.0715*** -0.0729*** -0.0329*** -0.0737*** -0.0284*** 0.0226 -0.0791*** -0.00877 
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.00722) (0.00816) (0.0107) (0.0195) (0.00861) (0.00682) 
LN_CORRUPTIO
N -0.0809* -0.0536 -0.0934*** -0.00492 -0.0569 -0.433*** -0.0387 -0.0898*** 
(0.0476) (0.0472) (0.0295) (0.0322) (0.0432) (0.0790) (0.0338) (0.0274) 
LN_DEMOCRATI
CACCOUNTABIL
ITY 
-0.0161 -0.00892 -0.0427 0.00498 -0.0507 0.157* 0.0489 0.175*** 
(0.0530) (0.0528) (0.0312) (0.0360) (0.0457) (0.0860) (0.0378) (0.0307) 
LN_LAW&ORDE
R -0.141** -0.0656 -0.0998*** -0.107*** -0.0336 -0.213** -0.137*** 0.0298 
(0.0589) (0.0572) (0.0349) (0.0389) (0.0520) (0.0935) (0.0410) (0.0333) 
LN_MILITARY 
INPOLITICS 0.0329 0.0274 -0.0488 0.0311 -0.0484 -0.188** -0.00866 -0.0938*** 
(0.0566) (0.0563) (0.0354) (0.0381) (0.0516) (0.0955) (0.0404) (0.0343) 
LN_INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 0.241*** 0.233*** 0.0944** 0.0634 0.123* -0.228* 0.166*** -0.0183 
(0.0697) (0.0694) (0.0435) (0.0472) (0.0635) (0.117) (0.0496) (0.0391) 
LN_ETHNICT 
ENSIONS 0.239*** 0.195*** 0.102** 0.0457 0.211*** -0.0574 0.172*** 0.0655* 
(0.0651) (0.0647) (0.0408) (0.0442) (0.0593) (0.108) (0.0467) (0.0394) 
FRLAW -0.197 -0.223 -0.0162 -0.0453 -0.228* -0.0563 -0.128 0.0498 
(0.165) (0.174) (0.101) (0.139) (0.137) (0.249) (0.146) (0.0742) 
INI_LN_PRIVATE 
CREDIT 0.543***        
(0.103) 
INI_LN_PRIVATE 
CREDIT2  0.588***       
(0.106) 
INI_LN_M2 0.579*** 
(0.0876) 
INI_LN_LIQUID 
LIABILITIES    0.513***     
(0.101) 
INI_LN_DOMEST
IC CREDIT     0.746***    
(0.0869) 
INI_LN_CREDIT 
TO GOV'T&      0.447***   
(0.0732) 
INI_LN_BANKDE
POSITS       0.509***  
(0.0983) 
INI_LN_PRIVATE
VSCENTRAL        0.496*** 
(0.0755) 
CONSTANT 0.614 0.265 0.281 0.754* 0.0703 0.781 0.315 1.726*** 
(0.426) (0.439) (0.347) (0.402) (0.371) (0.562) (0.378) (0.343) 
OBSERVATIONS 827 833 1,007 815 962 974 832 964 
NO.OF COUNTRY 47 47 57 46 55 57 47 57 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 8 2 Years lagged FDI and ICRG 1984-2011 
VARIABLES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5) EFFICIENCY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN_FDI 0.0148 0.0219* 0.0142** 0.0199** 0.0177* 0.0408** 0.0325*** 0.0134** 
(0.0120) (0.0118) (0.00664) (0.00790) (0.0106) (0.0176) (0.00854) (0.00602) 
LN_TRADE 0.0658 0.110* 0.347*** 0.294*** 0.134** 0.318*** 0.314*** 0.152*** 
(0.0644) (0.0645) (0.0369) (0.0433) (0.0538) (0.0990) (0.0473) (0.0345) 
LN_INFLATION -0.0706*** -0.0731*** -0.0268*** -0.0644*** -0.0337*** 0.0177 -0.0733*** -0.00535 
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.00729) (0.00822) (0.0109) (0.0198) (0.00908) (0.00704) 
LN_CORRUPTION -0.0869* -0.0442 -0.0915*** 0.00305 -0.0488 -0.433*** -0.0308 -0.0845*** 
(0.0489) (0.0488) (0.0294) (0.0322) (0.0435) (0.0792) (0.0353) (0.0278) 
LN_DEMOCRATI
CACCOUNTABILI
TY 
-0.00404 0.0114 -0.0339 0.00858 -0.0529 0.103 0.0390 0.170*** 
(0.0561) (0.0559) (0.0318) (0.0368) (0.0474) (0.0882) (0.0405) (0.0318) 
LN_LAW&ORDER -0.175*** -0.0865 -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.0723 -0.214** -0.158*** 0.0369 
(0.0607) (0.0588) (0.0349) (0.0386) (0.0532) (0.0942) (0.0426) (0.0338) 
LN_MILITARY 
INPOLITICS -0.0276 -0.0149 -0.0718** -0.0338 -0.0633 -0.159 -0.0529 -0.117*** 
(0.0601) (0.0599) (0.0361) (0.0392) (0.0535) (0.0980) (0.0435) (0.0355) 
LN_INTERNAL 
CONFLICT 0.254*** 0.255*** 0.00145 0.0365 0.118* -0.372*** 0.152*** -0.0394 
(0.0717) (0.0715) (0.0421) (0.0470) (0.0626) (0.114) (0.0517) (0.0397) 
LN_ETHNICT 
ENSIONS 0.252*** 0.205*** 0.121*** 0.0967** 0.205*** -0.0398 0.208*** 0.0867** 
(0.0677) (0.0677) (0.0410) (0.0446) (0.0607) (0.109) (0.0492) (0.0402) 
FRLAW -0.207 -0.234 -0.00736 -0.0431 -0.235* -0.0492 -0.125 0.0401 
(0.172) (0.181) (0.102) (0.143) (0.141) (0.252) (0.149) (0.0751) 
INI_LN_PRIVATE 
CREDIT 0.558***        
(0.107) 
INI_LN_PRIVATE 
CREDIT2  0.604***       
(0.110) 
INI_LN_M2 0.573*** 
(0.0886) 
INI_LN_LIQUID 
LIABILITIES    0.517***     
(0.104) 
INI_LN_DOMESTI
C CREDIT     0.737***    
(0.0897) 
INI_LN_CREDIT 
TO GOV'T&      0.448***   
(0.0740) 
INI_LN_BANKDE
POSITS       0.520***  
(0.101) 
INI_LN_PRIVATE
VSCENTRAL        0.493*** 
(0.0763) 
CONSTANT 0.835* 0.426 0.451 0.658 0.336 1.108** 0.254 1.543*** 
(0.442) (0.456) (0.347) (0.412) (0.374) (0.544) (0.390) (0.348) 
OBSERVATIONS 780 785 950 769 906 921 785 911 
NO.OF COUNTRY 47 47 57 46 55 57 47 57 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 9 2 years lagged ODA and ICRG 1998-2011 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN
_ODA -0.140*** -0.135*** -0.0520*** -0.0437*** -0.104*** -0.0425 -0.0763*** -0.0154 
 (0.0238) (0.0235) (0.0128) (0.0137) (0.0219) (0.0301) (0.0152) (0.0138) 
LN_ 
TRADE 0.291*** 0.301*** 0.332*** 0.156*** 0.426*** -0.117 0.237*** 0.109** 
 (0.100) (0.0992) (0.0504) (0.0577) (0.0865) (0.119) (0.0640) (0.0530) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0527** -0.0482** -0.0303*** -0.0253** -0.0431** 0.0222 -0.0362*** 0.00110 
 (0.0206) (0.0204) (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.0178) (0.0246) (0.0131) (0.0109) 
LN_CORR
UPTION -0.00904 0.00784 -0.101*** 0.0143 -0.0413 -0.213*** -0.0218 -0.00521 
 (0.0683) (0.0677) (0.0349) (0.0394) (0.0598) (0.0821) (0.0436) (0.0365) 
LN_DEM
OCRATI 
CACCOU
NTABILI
TY 
0.107 0.108 -0.0459 0.0845* 0.0339 -0.00743 0.0504 0.0384 
 (0.0866) (0.0858) (0.0458) (0.0499) (0.0785) (0.108) (0.0553) (0.0477) 
LN_LAW
&ORDER 0.0112 0.0293 -0.127** -0.105 0.0403 -0.181 -0.0596 0.0107 
 (0.116) (0.115) (0.0626) (0.0666) (0.107) (0.147) (0.0738) (0.0670) 
LN_MILI
TARY IN 
POLITICS 
0.0582 0.0880 -0.173*** -0.00290 0.0162 0.0433 0.0290 -0.0215 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.0478) (0.0685) (0.0820) (0.113) (0.0758) (0.0501) 
LN_INTE
RNAL 
CONFLIC
T 
0.112 0.0858 0.291*** 0.0904 0.237* -0.106 0.140 0.0948 
 (0.155) (0.153) (0.0796) (0.0892) (0.137) (0.187) (0.0988) (0.0830) 
LN_ETHN
IC 
TENSION
S 
-0.102 -0.102 -0.0487 -0.139** -0.0258 -0.201 -0.0793 0.136** 
 (0.105) (0.104) (0.0560) (0.0607) (0.0959) (0.132) (0.0673) (0.0590) 
CONSTA
NT 1.044* 1.047* 2.032*** 2.735*** 0.509 2.816*** 1.863*** 3.428*** 
 (0.581) (0.576) (0.296) (0.335) (0.507) (0.697) (0.371) (0.313) 
         
OBSERVA
TIONS 570 570 635 570 635 634 570 603 
R-
SQUARE
D 
0.089 0.087 0.170 0.063 0.087 0.029 0.089 0.027 
NUMBER 
OF 
COUNTR
YCODE 
63 63 70 63 70 70 63 68 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 10 2 years lagged Reimttances and ICRG 1998-2011 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN
_REMITT
ANCES 
0.0981*** 0.0985*** 0.0438*** 0.0520*** 0.103*** 0.0405* 0.0771*** 0.0181** 
 (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.00879) (0.00963) (0.0168) (0.0212) (0.0111) (0.00906) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.396*** 0.408*** 0.322*** 0.189*** 0.518*** -0.0953 0.259*** 0.0605 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.0497) (0.0566) (0.0949) (0.120) (0.0650) (0.0513) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0394* -0.0364* -0.0261*** -0.0216** -0.0399** 0.00369 -0.0308** 0.00507 
 (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.00947) (0.0107) (0.0181) (0.0230) (0.0123) (0.00989) 
LN_CORR
UPTION -0.0270 -0.00353 -0.0725** -0.00787 -0.00682 -0.198** -0.0292 0.00370 
 (0.0728) (0.0729) (0.0334) (0.0377) (0.0638) (0.0805) (0.0433) (0.0340) 
LN_DEM
OCRATI 
CACCOU
NTABILIT
Y 
0.0212 0.0392 0.000769 -0.0148 0.0975 -0.0393 -0.0165 0.0864* 
 (0.0969) (0.0971) (0.0457) (0.0502) (0.0873) (0.110) (0.0576) (0.0464) 
LN_LAW
&ORDER -0.0435 -0.0382 -0.148** -0.126** -0.102 -0.125 -0.115 -0.0580 
(0.120) (0.120) (0.0578) (0.0615) (0.111) (0.139) (0.0706) (0.0610) 
LN_MILI
TARY IN 
POLITICS 
-0.107 -0.0996 -0.190*** -0.0341 -0.0471 0.0209 -0.0361 -0.0270 
 (0.123) (0.123) (0.0452) (0.0635) (0.0863) (0.109) (0.0729) (0.0461) 
LN_INTE
RNAL 
CONFLIC
T 
0.308* 0.276* 0.261*** 0.126 0.242 -0.118 0.171* 0.103 
 (0.167) (0.167) (0.0773) (0.0864) (0.148) (0.187) (0.0992) (0.0791) 
LN_ETHN
IC 
TENSION
S 
-0.0958 -0.115 -0.0420 -0.0650 -0.0641 -0.120 -0.0427 0.121** 
(0.103) (0.103) (0.0492) (0.0531) (0.0940) (0.119) (0.0610) (0.0508) 
CONSTAN
T 1.131* 1.159* 2.311*** 2.805*** 0.717 2.839*** 2.184*** 3.713*** 
 (0.622) (0.623) (0.286) (0.322) (0.547) (0.691) (0.369) (0.295) 
OBSERVA
TIONS 604 604 673 610 673 672 610 628 
R-
SQUARED 0.102 0.102 0.199 0.113 0.144 0.023 0.155 0.042 
NUMBER 
OF 
COUNTR
YCODE 
67 67 74 67 74 74 67 72 
Standard errors in parentheses, 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 11 2 years lagged FDI and ICRG 1998-2011 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN
_FDI 0.0944*** 0.0867*** 0.0268*** 0.0284*** 0.0715*** 0.0315 0.0433*** 0.0175** 
 (0.0190) (0.0190) (0.00861) (0.00975) (0.0164) (0.0202) (0.0112) (0.00855) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.301*** 0.317*** 0.319*** 0.178*** 0.461*** -0.106 0.254*** 0.0732 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.0511) (0.0588) (0.0971) (0.120) (0.0677) (0.0510) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0425* -0.0391* -0.0256** -0.0232** -0.0343* -0.000863 -0.0324** 0.00663 
 (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0100) (0.0114) (0.0190) (0.0236) (0.0132) (0.0101) 
LN_CORR
UPTION -0.0539 -0.0310 -0.0911*** -0.0221 -0.0465 -0.222*** -0.0504 0.0134 
 (0.0760) (0.0763) (0.0352) (0.0403) (0.0669) (0.0825) (0.0464) (0.0347) 
LN_DEM
OCRATI 
CACCOU
NTABILIT
Y 
0.0235 0.0433 0.00179 0.0102 0.0967 -0.0297 0.00466 0.0870* 
 (0.0996) (0.100) (0.0477) (0.0528) (0.0907) (0.112) (0.0609) (0.0468) 
LN_LAW
&ORDER -0.112 -0.106 -0.151** -0.161** -0.128 -0.188 -0.156** -0.0250 
 (0.125) (0.126) (0.0610) (0.0656) (0.116) (0.143) (0.0756) (0.0622) 
LN_MILI
TARY IN 
POLITICS 
0.0255 0.0276 -0.167*** 0.00573 0.0288 0.0264 0.0200 -0.00811 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.0484) (0.0680) (0.0920) (0.114) (0.0783) (0.0479) 
LN_INTE
RNAL 
CONFLIC
T 
0.417** 0.385** 0.339*** 0.192** 0.381** -0.0683 0.272*** 0.0942 
 (0.171) (0.172) (0.0801) (0.0907) (0.152) (0.188) (0.104) (0.0788) 
LN_ETHN
IC 
TENSION
S 
-0.0722 -0.0966 -0.0477 -0.0669 -0.0509 -0.0966 -0.0397 0.104** 
 (0.109) (0.110) (0.0532) (0.0580) (0.101) (0.125) (0.0669) (0.0530) 
CONSTAN
T 1.149* 1.176* 2.129*** 2.667*** 0.562 2.794*** 1.940*** 3.616*** 
 (0.631) (0.634) (0.293) (0.334) (0.557) (0.687) (0.385) (0.292) 
 
OBSERVA
TIONS 614 614 685 619 685 684 619 642 
R-
SQUARED 0.081 0.074 0.157 0.067 0.094 0.023 0.087 0.033 
NUMBER 
OF 
COUNTR
YCODE 
68 68 75 68 75 75 68 73 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 12 2 years lagged ODA and WGI 1998-2011 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN
_ODA -0.150*** -0.0973*** -0.0568*** -0.0617*** -0.127*** -0.110*** -0.0621*** -0.00912 
(0.0214) (0.0267) (0.0113) (0.0137) (0.0181) (0.0311) (0.0135) (0.0112) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.377*** 0.134 0.288*** 0.317*** 0.331*** -0.173 0.297*** 0.159*** 
(0.0768) (0.0967) (0.0376) (0.0493) (0.0602) (0.105) (0.0488) (0.0364) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0166 -0.0148 -0.0171** -0.0184* -0.00606 -0.0182 -0.0254*** 0.00833 
(0.0148) (0.0185) (0.00754) (0.00955) (0.0121) (0.0210) (0.00934) (0.00732) 
WGI_VOI
CEANDA
CCOUNT
ABILITY 
0.0829 -0.0131 0.0496 0.102** 0.162*** 0.300*** 0.0176 0.0866*** 
(0.0704) (0.0891) (0.0337) (0.0452) (0.0543) (0.0939) (0.0449) (0.0332) 
WGI_POL
ITICALST
ABILITY
ANDABSE
NCE 
0.0680 0.00135 0.0317 0.00713 0.0440 -0.247*** -0.00771 0.111*** 
(0.0427) (0.0538) (0.0209) (0.0274) (0.0335) (0.0584) (0.0271) (0.0202) 
WGI_GO
VERNME
NTEFFEC
TIVENES
S 
-0.0667 0.0467 0.0999** -0.0838 0.0370 -0.248* 0.0378 -0.0425 
(0.0906) (0.118) (0.0471) (0.0582) (0.0756) (0.131) (0.0597) (0.0471) 
WGI_REG
ULATOR
YQUALIT
Y 
0.0775 0.244*** -0.0421 -0.0119 0.0550 0.217** 0.0993** 0.0906** 
(0.0723) (0.0930) (0.0371) (0.0464) (0.0593) (0.105) (0.0468) (0.0365) 
WGI_RUL
EOFLAW 0.266*** 0.257** 0.159*** 0.211*** 0.181** 0.312** 0.198*** 0.0353 
(0.0870) (0.109) (0.0460) (0.0560) (0.0742) (0.129) (0.0551) (0.0455) 
WGI_CON
TROLOF
CORRUP
TION 
0.122* -0.0652 -0.0554 0.0467 0.0173 -0.262** -0.0503 -0.00620 
(0.0710) (0.0898) (0.0367) (0.0456) (0.0588) (0.102) (0.0453) (0.0361) 
CONSTAN
T 1.112*** 2.344*** 2.351*** 2.102*** 1.463*** 1.912*** 1.953*** 3.734*** 
(0.350) (0.441) (0.174) (0.224) (0.278) (0.484) (0.223) (0.168) 
    
OBSERVA
TIONS 1,011 1,001 1,209 1,007 1,203 1,181 999 1,140 
R-
SQUARED 0.117 0.050 0.107 0.101 0.106 0.047 0.107 0.094 
NUMBER 
OF 
COUNTR
YCODE 
99 98 118 98 117 115 98 113 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 13 2 years lagged Remittances and WGI 1998-2011 
VARIABL
ES DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN
_REMITT
ANCES 
0.0687*** 0.0789*** 0.0379*** 0.0308*** 0.0772*** 0.0507*** 0.0496*** 0.0138** 
(0.0130) (0.0172) (0.00708) (0.00771) (0.0123) (0.0191) (0.00868) (0.00615) 
LN_TRAD
E 0.363*** 0.228** 0.310*** 0.201*** 0.412*** -0.127 0.254*** 0.177*** 
(0.0815) (0.107) (0.0420) (0.0481) (0.0731) (0.112) (0.0542) (0.0368) 
LN_INFL
ATION -0.0165 -0.0161 -0.0194*** -0.0164* -0.00824 0.000416 -0.0209** 0.00791 
(0.0144) (0.0191) (0.00739) (0.00858) (0.0129) (0.0199) (0.00963) (0.00655) 
WGI_VOI
CEANDAC
COUNTA
BILITY 
-0.0406 -0.0430 -0.0387 -0.0179 0.0674 0.275*** -0.0341 0.0738** 
(0.0689) (0.0910) (0.0338) (0.0410) (0.0592) (0.0902) (0.0461) (0.0299) 
WGI_POL
ITICALST
ABILITYA
NDABSEN
CE 
0.0558 0.0338 0.0276 -0.00452 0.0436 -0.302*** 0.00507 0.0756*** 
(0.0418) (0.0551) (0.0211) (0.0248) (0.0368) (0.0562) (0.0279) (0.0183) 
WGI_GOV
ERNMEN
TEFFECT
IVENESS 
-0.0157 -0.0390 0.0607 0.0250 0.0244 -0.226* 0.0171 0.0215 
(0.0881) (0.117) (0.0474) (0.0524) (0.0826) (0.127) (0.0593) (0.0420) 
WGI_REG
ULATOR
YQUALIT
Y 
0.302*** 0.274*** -0.0119 0.0687* 0.184*** 0.124 0.122*** 0.0989*** 
(0.0689) (0.0913) (0.0364) (0.0408) (0.0634) (0.0980) (0.0461) (0.0319) 
WGI_RUL
EOFLAW 0.375*** 0.385*** 0.194*** 0.219*** 0.303*** 0.283** 0.267*** 0.0693* 
(0.0827) (0.109) (0.0442) (0.0491) (0.0776) (0.120) (0.0551) (0.0398) 
WGI_CON
TROLOFC
ORRUPTI
ON 
0.0259 0.00795 -0.0455 -0.0498 0.00168 -0.251*** -0.0711 -0.0496 
(0.0695) (0.0918) (0.0363) (0.0412) (0.0632) (0.0966) (0.0464) (0.0321) 
CONSTAN
T 1.799*** 2.367*** 2.451*** 2.824*** 1.644*** 2.060*** 2.373*** 3.701*** 
(0.349) (0.461) (0.181) (0.207) (0.315) (0.483) (0.232) (0.159) 
OBSERVA
TIONS 1,006 1,004 1,177 1,008 1,171 1,157 1,008 1,102 
R-
SQUARED 0.144 0.076 0.111 0.083 0.125 0.054 0.119 0.097 
NUMBER 
OF 
COUNTR
YCODE 
101 100 118 100 117 117 100 113 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Appendix 14 2 years lagged FDI and WGI 1998-2011 
VARIABLE
S DEPTH (1) DEPTH (2) DEPTH (3) DEPTH (4) DEPTH (5)
EFFICIEN
CY (1) 
EFFICIEN
CY (2) 
EFFICIEN
CY (3) 
LAG2_LN_
FDIGDP 0.0681*** 0.0609*** 0.0277*** 0.0252*** 0.0586*** 0.00843 0.0335*** 0.0310*** 
(0.0124) (0.0158) (0.00621) (0.00729) (0.0106) (0.0168) (0.00790) (0.00585) 
LN_TRADE 0.223*** 0.0957 0.244*** 0.219*** 0.294*** -0.167 0.253*** 0.118*** 
(0.0787) (0.100) (0.0385) (0.0468) (0.0656) (0.104) (0.0506) (0.0358) 
LN_INFLA
TION -0.0118 -0.00862 -0.0123* -0.0190** 0.00183 -0.0125 -0.0218** 0.00996 
(0.0147) (0.0187) (0.00739) (0.00880) (0.0127) (0.0201) (0.00947) (0.00689) 
WGI_VOIC
EANDACC
OUNTABIL
ITY 
-0.0361 -0.0831 0.00792 0.0288 0.0474 0.339*** -0.00989 0.0867*** 
(0.0708) (0.0910) (0.0338) (0.0423) (0.0580) (0.0913) (0.0461) (0.0317) 
WGI_POLI
TICALSTA
BILITYAN
DABSENCE 
0.0939** 0.0260 0.0589*** 0.0320 0.0590 -0.243*** 0.0286 0.111*** 
(0.0433) (0.0554) (0.0214) (0.0258) (0.0364) (0.0575) (0.0281) (0.0197) 
WGI_GOVE
RNMENTE
FFECTIVE
NESS 
-0.0751 -0.0709 0.0728 -0.0208 0.00661 -0.286** 0.00346 -0.0241 
(0.0916) (0.120) (0.0472) (0.0548) (0.0804) (0.127) (0.0609) (0.0448) 
WGI_REGU
LATORYQ
UALITY 
0.303*** 0.404*** -0.0245 0.0724* 0.186*** 0.256** 0.148*** 0.0622* 
(0.0726) (0.0940) (0.0363) (0.0433) (0.0639) (0.102) (0.0476) (0.0341) 
WGI_RULE
OFLAW 0.285*** 0.346*** 0.199*** 0.217*** 0.229*** 0.358*** 0.262*** 0.0349 
(0.0877) (0.112) (0.0457) (0.0524) (0.0790) (0.126) (0.0567) (0.0435) 
WGI_CONT
ROLOFCO
RRUPTION 
0.0648 -0.0620 -0.0510 -0.00801 0.00438 -0.321*** -0.0593 -0.00499 
(0.0734) (0.0940) (0.0374) (0.0438) (0.0638) (0.101) (0.0476) (0.0352) 
CONSTANT 2.322*** 2.859*** 2.723*** 2.750*** 2.065*** 2.286*** 2.367*** 3.912*** 
(0.340) (0.434) (0.168) (0.202) (0.286) (0.453) (0.219) (0.156) 
OBSERVAT
IONS 1,040 1,033 1,244 1,041 1,234 1,213 1,036 1,171 
R-
SQUARED 0.126 0.076 0.118 0.101 0.115 0.047 0.128 0.120 
NO. OF 
COUNTRY 104 103 123 103 122 120 103 118 
Standard errors in parentheses,  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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